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The response of both developed and
developing countries to these
developments has been first, to shift the tax
burden from (mobile) capital to (less
mobile) labor, and second, when further
increased taxation of labor becomes
politically and economically difficult, to cut
government services. Thus, globalization
and tax competition lead to a fiscal crisis
for countries that wish to continue to
provide those government services to their
citizens, at the same time that demographic
factors and the increased income inequality,
job insecurity, and income volatility that
result from globalization render such
services more necessary.
From its beginnings late in the 19th
century, the modem state has been
financed primarily by progressive income
taxation. The income tax differs from other
forms of taxation (such as consumption or
social security taxes) in that in theory it
includes income from capital in the tax
base, even if it is saved and not consumed.
Because the rich save more than the poor, a
tax that includes income from capital in its
base is more progressive (taxes the rich
more heavily) than a tax that excludes
income from capital (e.g., a consumption
tax or a payroll tax). However, the ability to
tax saved income from capital (i.e., income
not vulnerable to consumption taxes) is
impaired if the capital can be shifted
overseas to jurisdictions where it escapes
taxation.
Two recent developments have
dramatically augmented the ability of both
individuals and corporations to earn
income overseas free of income taxation:
the effective end of withholding taxation
by developed countries, and the rise of
production tax havens in developing
countries. Since the United States abolished
its withholding tax on interest paid to
foreigners in 1984, no major capital
importing country has been able to impose
such a tax for fear of driving mobile capital
elsewhere (or increasing the cost of capital
for domestic borrowers, including the
government itselD. The result is that
individuals can generally earn investment
income free of host country taxation in any
of the worlds major economies. Moreover,
even developed countries find it
Lexceedingly difficult to effectively collect
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the tax on the foreign income of their
individual residents in the absence of
withholding taxes imposed by host
countries, because the investments can be
made through tax havens with strong bank
secrecy laws. Developing countries, with
much weaker tax administrations, find this
task almost impossible. Thus, cross-border
investment income can largely be earned
free of either host or home country
taxation.
For example, consider a wealthy
Mexican who wishes to earn tax-free
interest income from investing in the bonds
of an American corporation. All he needs
to do is set up, for a nominal fee, a
Cayman Islands corporation to hold the
bonds. The interest payments are then
made to the Caymans corporation without
any U.S. tax withheld under the so-called
"portfolio interest exemption" (Internal
Revenue Code section 871(h)). The
individual does not report the income to
the Mexican tax authorities, and they have
no way of knowing that the Caymans
corporation is effectively an "incorporated
pocketbook" of the Mexican resident. Nor
are the exchange of information provisions
of the U.S.-Mexico tax treaty of any help,
because the IRS has no way of knowing
that the recipient of the interest payments
is controlled by a Mexican resident and
therefore cannot report this to the Mexican
authorities. As a result, the income is
earned completely free of tax (the
Caymans, of course, impose no income
taxes of their own).
When we switch our attention from
passive to productive investment, a similar
threat to the taxing capacity of both home

and host jurisdictions emerges. In the last
decade, competition for inbound
investment has led an increasing number of
countries (103, as of 19'98) to offer tax
holidays specifically geared to foreign
corporate investors. Given the relative ease
with which an integrated multinational can
shift production facilities in response to tax
rates, such "production tax havens" enable
multinationals to derive most of their
income abroad free of host country
taxation. Moreover, most developed
countries (including the United States) do
not dare impose current taxation (or
sometimes any taxation) on the foreign
source business income of their resident
multinationals, for fear of reducing the
competitiveness of those multinationals
against multinationals of other countries. If
they did, new multinationals could be set
up as residents of jurisdictions that do not
tax such foreign source income. Thus,
business income can also be earned abroad
largely free of either host or home country
taxation.
For example: Intel Corporation, a top
10 multinational, has operations in more
than 30 countries around the globe. The
company states that "[a]n Intel chip
developed at a design center in Oregon
might be manufactured at a wafer
fabrication facility in Ireland, packaged and
tested in Malaysia, and then sold to a
customer in Australia. Another chip might
be designed in Japan, fabricated in Israel,
packaged and tested in Arizona, and sold
in China." Specifically, outside the United
States, Intel has major manufacturing
facilities in Puerto Rico, China, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Ireland, and Israel. Thus,
outside the United States, all of Intel'.s
manufacturing facilities are located in
countries granting tax holidays. Nor does
Intel pay current U.S. tax on its income
from those foreign operations, because
under U.S. law, active income earned by
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals
is not taxed until it is repatriated in the
form of dividends, which Intel can delay
for many years. Thus, the effective tax rate
on Intel's foreign source income is far
below the nominal U.S. corporate rate of
35 percent.
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If income from capital can escape the
income tax net, the tax becomes in effect a
tax on labor. Several empirical studies have
in fact suggested that in some developed
jurisdictions the effective tax rate on
income from capital approaches zero, and
tax rates on capital have tended to go
down sharply since the early 1980s (when
exchange controls were relaxed). As a
result, countries that used to rely on the
revenues from the income tax are forced to
increase relatively regressive taxes.
The two fastest growing taxes in OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) member countries in
recent years have been consumption taxes
(from 12 percent of total revenues in 1965
to 18 percent in 1995) and payroll taxes
(from 19 percent to 27 percent), both of
which are more regressive than the income
tax. Over the same period, the personal
and corporate income taxes have not
grown as a percentage of total revenues
(the personal income tax accounted for 26
percent of total revenues in 1965 and 27
percent in 1995, while the figures for the
corporate income tax are 9 percent and 8
percent respectively). The total tax revenue
as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) in developed countries went up
sharply during the same period (from an
average of 28 percent in 1965 to almost
40 percent in 1994), and this increase is
largely accounted for by the rise of
consumption and payroll taxes. Moreover,
there is evidence that as the degree of
openness of an economy in OECD member
countries increases, taxes on capital tend to
go down while taxes on labor go up
(the income tax is imposed on both capital
and labor, so that its stability may mask
this trend).
The same trends can be observed in
developing countries as well. In nonOECD member countries (outside the
Middle East) total government revenues as
a share of GDP rose from an average of
18.8 percent in 1975-80 to 20.1 percent in
1986-92. This growth was financed
primarily by the growth of revenues from
the VAT in the same period (from 25.5
percent of total revenues to 31.8 percent).
At the same time, revenues from both the
individual and the corporate income tax
were flat or declined.
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The drawbacks of tax competition for
developed countries are relatively clear,
because such countries have an elaborate
social insurance safety net that requires a
high level of government expenditure and
that is threatened by tax competition. But
how does tax competition affect developing
countries?
First, it should be pointed out that
developing countries need the revenues at
least as much as developed countries do, if
not more. A common misperception is that
only OECD member countries are
confronted by a fiscal crisis as a result of
the increasing numbers of elderly people in
the population. In fact, the increase in
dependency ratios (the ratio of the elderly
to the working population) is expected to
take place in other geographic areas as
well, as fertility rates go down and health
care improves. Outside the OECD and the
transition economies, the dependency ratio
starts in the single digits in the 1990s, but
rises to just below 30 percent by 2100.
Moreover, while outside the OECD and the
transition economies direct spending on
social insurance is much lower, other forms
of government spending (e.g., government
employment) effectively fulfill a social
insurance role. In Latin America, for
example, direct government spending on
social insurance is much lower than
indirect spending through government
employment and procurement programs.
Moreover, it seems strange to argue that
developing countries need tax revenues less
than developed countries because they
have less developed social insurance
programs. If one accepts the normative
case for social insurance, it applies to
developing countries with even greater
force because of widespread poverty, which
means that losing a job can have much
more dire consequences. But the need for
revenues in developing countries goes far
beyond social insurance. In some
developing countries revenues are needed
to insure the very survival of organized
government, as the Russian experience

demonstrates. In other, more stable
developing countries, revenues are needed
primarily to provide for adequate
education (investment in human capital),
which many regard as the key to
promoting development. For example, the
UN has estimated that for only $30-$40
billion, all people in the world can obtain
basic social services (such as elementary
education). Given current trends in foreign
aid, most of these funds have to come from
developing country governments.
Second, the standard advice by
economists to small open economies is that
they should refrain from taxing foreign
investors, because such investors cannot be
made to bear the burden of any tax
imposed by the capital importing country
Therefore, the tax will necessarily be
shifted to less mobile factors in the host
country, such as labor and/or land, and it is
more efficient to tax those factors directly
But while this argument seems quite valid
as applied to portfolio investment, it seems
less valid in regard to FDI (foreign direct
investment, i.e., investment by
multinational enterprises), for two reasons.
First, the standard advice does not apply if
a foreign tax credit is available in the home
country of the investor, which frequently
would be the case for FDI. Second, the
standard advice assumes that the host
country is small. However, an extensive
literature on multinationals suggests that
typically they exist in order to earn
economic rents. In that case, the host
country is no longer "small" in the
economic sense. That is, there is a reason
for the investor to be there and not
elsewhere. Therefore, any tax imposed on
such rents (as long as it is below 100
percent) will not necessarily drive the
investor to leave even if it is unable to shift
the burden of the tax to labor or
landowners.
This argument clearly holds in the case
of rents that are linked to a specific
location, such as natural resources or a
large market. But what if the rent can be
earned in a large number of potential
locations? In this case, the host country
will not be able to tax the rent if the
multinational can credibly threaten to go
elsewhere, although once the investment
has been made the rent can be taxed. This

situation, which is probably the most
common, would require coordinated action
to enable all host countries to tax the rent
earned within their borders. Some
possibilities for such action are described
below. This relates to the final argument,
which is that host countries need to offer
tax incentives to be competitive. An
extensive literature has demonstrated that
taxes do in fact play a crucial role in
determining investment location decisions.
But all of these studies emphasize that the
tax incentives are crucial given the
availability of such incentives elsewhere. Thus,
it can be argued that given the need for tax
revenues, developing countries would in
general prefer to refrain from granting tax
incentives, if only they could be assured
that no other developing country would be
able to grant such incentives.
Thus, restricting the ability of
developing countries to compete in
granting tax incentives does not truly
restrict their autonomy or counter their
interests. That is the case whenever they
grant the incentive only for fear of
competition from other developing
countries, and would not have granted it
but for such fear. Whenever competition
from other countries drives the tax
incentive, eliminating the competition does
not hurt the developing country, and may
aid its revenue raising efforts (assuming it
can attract investment on other grounds,
which is typically the case). Moreover,
under the proposals described below,
developing countries remain free to lower
their tax rates generally (as opposed to
granting specific tax relief aimed at foreign
investors).
Two additional points need to be made
from a developing country perspective. The
first concerns the question of tax incidence.
Since the tax competition that is most
relevant to developing countries concerns
the corporate income tax, it is important to
attempt to assess the incidence of that tax
in evaluating the effects of collecting it on
the welfare of the developing country
Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no
consensus exists on the incidence of the
corporate tax. While the older studies have
tended to conclude that the tax is borne by
shareholders or by all capital providers,
more recent studies have suggested that the

tax is borne to a significant extent by
consumers or by labor. Another possibility
is that the tax on established corporations
was borne by those who were shareholders
at the time the tax was \mposed or
increased, because thereafter it is
capitalized into the price of the shares. It is
unlikely that this debate will be decided
any time soon (in fact, the incidence may
be shifting over time, especially as
globalization may enable corporations to
shift more of the tax burden to labor).
However, from the perspective of a
developing country deciding whether to
collect taxes from a multinational, three out
of the four possible alternatives for
incidence (current shareholders or capital
providers, old shareholders, and
consumers) are largely the residents of
other jurisdictions, and therefore from a
national welfare perspective the developing
country gains by collecting the tax. And
even if some of the tax is shifted to labor in
the developing country, it can be argued
that as a matter of tax administration it is
more efficient (as well as more politically
acceptable) to collect the tax from the
multinational than to attempt to collect it
from the workers.
Finally, it should be noted that a
developing country may want to collect
taxes from multinationals even if in general
it believes that the private sector is more
efficient in using the resources than the
public sector. That is because in the case of
a foreign multinational, the taxes that the
developing country fails to collect may
indeed be used by the private sector, but in
another jurisdiction, and therefore not
benefit the developing country One
possible solution, which is in fact
employed by developing countries, is to
refrain from taxing multinationals while
they re-invest domestically, but tax them
upon remittance of the profits abroad.
However, such taxation of dividends and
other forms of remittance is subject to the
same tax competition problem that we
discussed above. Thus, it would appear
that overcoming the tax competition
problem is in most cases in the interest of
developing countries, and the question
remains how to do so in the face of the
collective action problem described above.
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WHAT CAN 8( DON( ABOUT
TAX COMPHITION?
The tax competition problem is thus
essentially a problem of coordination and
trust. Each jurisdiction would prefer to tax
investors from abroad to gain the revenue,
but is afraid that by doing so it would drive
the investors to other jurisdictions that do
not tax them. If there were a way to
coordinate actions among the relevant
jurisdictions, they all could gain added
revenues without running the risk of losing
the investment.
A good illustration of how this dynamic
works is the history of German taxation of
interest income. In 1988, Germany
introduced a 10 percent withholding tax
on interest paid to bank depositors, but
had to abolish it within a few months
because of the magnitude of capital flight
to Luxembourg. In 1991, the German
Federal Constitutional Court held that
withholding taxes on wages but not on
interest violated the constitutional right to
equality: The government thereupon
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reintroduced the withholding tax on
interest, but made it inapplicable to nonresidents. Non-residents may, however, be
Germans investing through Luxembourg
bank accounts. To cope with this problem,
the Germans have led an EU effort to
introduce a 20 percent withholding tax on
all interest payments to EU residents.
However, both Luxembourg and the
United Kingdom have so far blocked the
adoption of this plan, arguing that it will
lead to a flight of investors to Switzerland
or the United States.
Thus, the key to finding a solution to
the tax competition problem is to attack it
on a broad multilateral basis, through an
organization such as the OECD. Under
current conditions, the OECD is the
natural choice for leading such coordinated
actions against tax competition, for three
reasons. First, for individual investors to
earn decent returns on their capital without
incurring excessive risks, they need to
invest in an OECD member country: Tax
havens do not offer adequate investment
opportunities, and developing countries are
generally considered too risky for portfolio
investment (other than through mutual
funds, which do not offer tax avoidance
opportunities). Thus, if all OECD members

- -t can be argued that given
the need for tax revenues,
developing countries would in
general prefer to refrain from
granting tax incentives, if only
they could be assured that no
other developing country would be
able to grant such incentives.

enforced taxation of portfolio investment, it
could be subject to tax without requiring
cooperation from the tax havens.
Second, about 85 percent of the world's
multinationals are headquartered in OECD
member countries. This is likely to
continue to be the case for a while, because
OECD members offer stable corporate and
securities law protection to investors that is
lacking in other countries. Thus, if all
OECD members agreed on a coordinated
basis to tax their multinationals currently
on their income from abroad, most of the
problem of tax competition from direct
investment could be solved.
Third, the OECD has the required
expertise (its model tax treaty is the global
standard) and h<Js already started on the
path of limiting tax competition. In 1998,
it adopted a report entitled Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. This
report is somewhat limited, because it only
addresses tax competition for financial
activities and services (as opposed to, e.g.,
Intels manufacturing plants). It also does
not address the taxation of investment
income. But it represents an extremely
useful first step, and proof that a consensus
can be reached on the tax competition
issue. (Switzerland and Luxembourg
abstained, but did not dare veto the
adoption of the report by the other
27 members of the OECD.)
The OECD makes a useful distinction
between tax competition in the form of
generally applicable lower tax rates, and
tax regimes designed to attract foreign
investors. This distinction is both
normatively and pragmatically sound:
Restricting tax competition should not and
cannot mean that voters in democratic
countries lose their right to determine the
size of the public sector through general
tax increases or reductions. But it does
mean that countries should not provide
windfalls for foreign investors at the
expense of the ability of other countries to
provide those public services their
residents desire. Such limitations are
particularly appropriate because those
foreign investors themselves often reside in
countries providing a high level of services,
and yet refuse to pay the tax price that
providing such services entails.

Depending on the OECD for solving the
tax competition problem suffers from one
major drawback: Developing countries are
left out, and may perceive actions by the
OECD as a cartel of rich countries
operating at their expense. In fact, as
pointed out above , it is unlikely that tax
competition benefits developing countries,
who can also use the tax revenues they give
up to attract foreign investors. If all
developing countries could be prevented
from competing in this fashion, they all
could gain. But in the longer run, it may be
better to entrust the fight against harmful
tax competition to the WTO, in which
developing countries are adequately
represented. This would also solve the
problem of what to do about the 15
percent of multinationals who are not
headquartered in OECD member countries
(a percentage that can be expected to grow
if the OECD indeed moves to restrict tax
competition for its multinationals).
To sum up: As a result of globalization
and tax competition, tax rules can no
longer be set by countries acting
unilaterally or by bilateral tax treaties. In a
world in which capital can move freely
across national borders and multinationals
are free to choose among many investment
locations, the ability of any one country
(or any two countries in cooperation) to
tax (or otherwise regulate) such capital is
severely limited. Any such unilateral
attempt will be undercut by other
countries, and will probably not even be
attempted in the name of preserving
national competitiveness. Thus, a
multilateral solution is essential if the
fundamental goals of taxation or other
regulation are to be preserved. Private
market activities that span the globe can
only be regulated or taxed by organizations
with a similar global reach.
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